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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
LELAND E. MATERN,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
-vs.RONALD D. PHILLIPS
by his guardian ad litem,
HEBER PHILLIPS,
Defendant and Respondent

Case
No. 8935

BRIEF OF AP·PELLANT
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The accident in question occurred on October 25,
1957, at the hour of 7:50 a.m. near the intersection of
Third East and Fifth South in Salt Lake City, Utah.
Appellant was driving his Ford pick-up truck south on
Third East. He stopped his truck for a red light at
Fifth South.
Respondent was driving a model 1949 Plymouth
sedan. Soon after he started driving he noticed that his
brakes were low. (R. 135) He pulled into a service station near the intersection of Third East and Fourth
1
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South. He had the service station attendant put some
brake fluid in. Without testing his brakes at all between
the time the fluid was put in and the time of the accident,
respondent drove out of the service station and proceeded
south on Third East at a speed of twenty to thirty miles
per hour. (R. 137A and 140) When respondent got to a
point approximately sixty feet behind appellant's truck,
he applied the brakes but had no pressure at all. Respondent's automobile crashed into the rear end of
appellant's truck at a speed of twenty to thirty miles per
hour. Respondent's automobile moved a distance of two
feet after the impact and appellant's truck moved a distance of twelve feet from the point of impact.
Appellant, other than being shook up, noticed no
difficulty or injuries at the scene of the accident. An hour
or so after the accident appellant noticed that his neck got
stiff and sore. It remained stiff and sore for a period of
two or three days. The stiffness disappeared for a period
of approximately two weeks and then it became stiff and
sore again. At about the time appellant's neck became
stiff and sore he got a case of

~lsian

flu and thought noth-

ing- of the stiffness or soreness in his neck but merely
thought it was causrd by the flu. T'he stiffness and soreneRs of a 1ll lt'llant 's neck and his headaches continued to
~ct w<H~t'

until they got so bad appellant consulted a doc-

lor on .Ta11uanr :20,

1~)58.

Dr. Hay Gn'tHle, n11 orthopedist, dignosed appellant's
eo11<lition ns chronic, moderately seYere, whiplash injury.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

(R. 86) The doctor advised appellant that he should go
into a hospital for treatment. Appellant was in the St.
Mark's Hospital for a period of nine days. He was discharged on February 3, 1958.
The treatment of appellant consisted primarily of
applying traction to his neck while he was in bed and the
wearing of a cervical neck brace when he was up and
moving around.
About April 1, 1958, Dr. Greene advised appellant
that he should try to return to work if possible on a parttime basis. (R. 108) Appellant tried to return to work but
was told by his foreman the company did not want appellant working until he could come back on a full-time
basis. (R. 61) Appellant then, at the suggestion of the
doctor, started working for a few hours each day on a
home that appellant was building. Appellant was notreleased to return to work until June 2, 1958. (R. 110)
The uncontradicted evidence shows that appellant
incurred the following out-of-pocket losses. (R. 66 to 70)
1. Lost wages from 1-20-58 to 6-2-58_ ...$1,691.69
2. St. Mark's HospitaL___________________________ 150.90
3. Professional pharmacy prescription

2.04

4. Cervical brace -------------------------------------5. Damage to truck __________________________________ _

17.34

39.31
6. Dr. Ray Greene ___________________________________ _ 145.00
TOTAL·-------------------------------$2,046.28
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At the time of the accident in question appellant was
employed by Western Steel Company as a mechanic
machinist.
The case was tried to a jury on June 10 and 11, 1958.
The trial court found that respondent was guilty of negligence as a matter of law and so instructed the jury. The
question of whether respondent's negligence caused or
resulted in the injuries complained of by appellant was
left to the jury. The jury found the issues in favor of
appellant and against the respondent and awarded appellant a verdict of $1,004.59. $39.31 was for truck damage,
$315.28 was the exact amount of the medical expenses incuprred by appellant and the balance of the verdict,
$650.00, was for general damages. ~~ppellant made a
motion that the jury Yerdict be increased or in the alternatiYe that appellant be granted a new trial. (R. 202A)
This motion \Yas denied by the court. (R. 2020)
POIXTS ARGrED BY ~\PPELL~\XT

1. The trial court's Instruction X o. 8 and its refusal
to give appellant's requested Instruction X o. 1 was prejudj<'ial error.
2. The dnnwg<.~s awarded by the jury were inade-

quate and the trial court should haYe increased the
a mount of t liP Yerdict or in the alternatiYe granted appel-

lant a

lH'W

t rinl.

4
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ARGUMENT
POINT

1

THE TRIAL COURT'S INSTRUCTION NO. 8
AND ITS REFUSAL TO GIVE APPELLANT'S
REQUESTED INSRUCTION N0.1 WAS PREJUDICIAL ERROR.
Before the trial of the case started, counsel for both
parties had a conference with Judge Hanson in his chambers. At that conference it was indicated by respondent's
counsel that he intended to go into the fact that appellant
had been involved in a similar accident approximately a
year before the accident in question. Judge Hanson indicated in chambers that respondent's counsel would be permitted to go into the fact of the prior accident providing
respondent was able to establish that said prior accident
had something to do with the injuries that appellant was
then complaining about. (R. 192-197) In view of the
court's indications in chambers, appellant's counsel
brought out the fact of the prior accident on direct examination. (R. 66) Appellant testified that the only injuries
he received in the prior accident was some pelvic injuries
and internal injuries. He testified he did not receive any
injury at all to his neck or back. (R. 66-68) Dr. Ray
Greene testified that if there had been any injury to appellant's neck caused in the November, 1956, accident, that
he would expect to have seen some evidence of that fact
in the X-rays. Dr. Greene testified he saw no changes in
the X-rays that indicated any injury to appellant's neck
in the prior accident. (R. 126, 127)
5
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At no place in Dr. Reed Clegg's testimony, the expert
called by respondent, was anything at all said that would
in any way indicate that appellant's whiplash injury
complained of in this case resulted from or had anything
to do with the prior accident of November, 1956. (R. 126142) Although respondent claimed that there was some
relationship between the whiplash injury suffered
by appellant that is the subject of this law suit and the
prior accident of November, 1956, all of the affirmative
evidence shows the prior accident had nothing at all to
do with the present injuries. An examination of the entire record fails to show any evidence of any kind that
tends in any way to indicate that the whiplash injury
suffered by the appellant after the accident in question
had anything to do with or was in any way caused by or
contributed to by the prior accident of November, 1956.
Since respondent claimed there was some connection
between the prior accident and appellant's present injuries and since appellant himself brought out as a part
of his direct case the fact of the prior accident, there was
no error on the part of the trial court in admitting evi<1Pnce of the fact of the prior accident. Ho-we\er, -when at
1he eoncl us ion of respondent's case. there -was no evidence
ut all in the n'cord. that tended to shLnY any connection
bPt ween the present injuries of appellant and the prior
tt<'eidPnt, it was the duty of the trial court to instruct the
jury that the prior aeeident had nothing to do with
npJH_,llnnt's prPsent injuries and it was the duty of the
t.rinl court to inst rnct the jury to disregard any and all
evidenee c·om·prning the prior aeeident in determining the
6
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cause of appellant's injuries and in assessing appellant's
damages. Appellant in his requested Instruction No. 1
requested the court to so instruct the jury relative to the
prior accident. The court refused to give said requested
instruction and failed to give it in substance or at all.
Instruction No. 8 as given by the court was as
follows : (R. 20)
' 'You are further instructed that if you find
that the plaintiff is entitled to damages, then in
awarding him damages you may consider only his
loss, if any, which a preponderance of the evidence
shows resulted from the accident on October 25,
1957. He is not entitled to damages for a condition
or loss from other accidents or causes unrelated to
the collision with the defendant's automobile."
A reading of Instruction No. 8 immediately shows
that the jury was permitted to consider the fact of the
prior accident and to speculate on what effect it may
have had on appellant's present injuries.
While the instruction itself may not be an incorrect
statement of the law, when it is read in light of the evidence that appears in the record concerning the prior
accident, and when it is read in light of the fact that
respondent failed completely to show any connection at
all between the prior accident and appellant's present
injuries, the prejudicial effect of the instruction can
immediately be seen. This is particularly true in view of
the fact that the trial court did not at any place instruct
the jury that there was no evidence showing any connection at all between the prior accident and appellant's
present injuries.
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The last sentence of the instruction which reads,
''He is not entitled to da;mages for a condition or loss
from other accidents or causes unrelated to the collision
with the defendant's automobile," permits the jury to
speculate or to infer that some part of the injury complained of by appellant was or could have been caused by
the prior accident.
We submit that it was prejudicial error for the court
to give its Instruction No.8 and its refusal to give appellant's requested Instruction X o. 1 -which reads as follows:
''The defendant in this case is claiming that
plaintiff's injuries, if any, were caused by the prior
accident of November of 1956. In this connection
you are instructed that the mere fact that plaintiff
was involved in said prior accident, standing alone,
is not sufficient evidence to sho-w that plaintiff's
injuries, if any, complained of in this action were
caused or contributed to by said prior accident.
you are instructed that there is no endence
that plaintiff's injuries. if any, were caused or contributed to by said prior accident and you are further instructed that you are to ignore the prior
accident in determining the cause of plaintiff's
injurit:•s, if an:¥, and in assessing plaintiff's damages, if an:¥.''
It is g"PllPrall~· held that eYidenre of a driYer's previous aecide11ts is inndmissible in a ri,¥il action arising
out of a motor YehirlL' accident, since such eYidence is
imnw h'rial in t 1w ddl'l'mination of the driYers ·negligence
on the ocen~ion in qw'stion. 5A ..:\m. Jur., Sec. 946 and
948, p. 836, :20 .A.L.R. (:2) 1:210.
8
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When respondent failed to show that the November,
19561 accident had anything to do with appellant's present injuries the same principle would apply, namely, that
evidence of the prior accident was immaterial and the
court should have instructed the jury to disregard such
evidence. Its refusal to so instruct was prejudicial error.
The, trial court agreed that there was no evidence
that tended to show any connection between the prior
accident and the present injuries of appellant, (R. 181)
but still refused to so instruct the jury.
POINT

2

THE DAMAGES AWARDED BY THE JURY
WERE INADEQUATE AND THE TRIAL
COURT SHOULD HAVE INCREASED THE
AMOUNT OF THE VERDICT OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE GRANED APPELLANT A NEW
TRIAL.
The trial court found that respondent was negligent
as a matter of law. The jury, by making an award to the
appellant, found that respondent's negligence resulted in
injury to the appellant. The uncontradicted evidence
shows that appellant sustained the following losses:
(R. 66-70)
Hospital Bill ------------------------------------$ 150.90
Prescription -----------------------------------2.04
Cervical Brace -------------------------------17.34
Truck Damage -------------------------------39.31
Doctor Bill ---------··------------------------------ 145.00
Loss of Wages __________________________________ 1,691.69
TOTAL ________________________ $2,046.28
9
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The uncontradicted evidence shows that appellant
suffered with a sore, stiff neck and suffered headaches
from the time of the accident down to the time of trial
and that appellant was still suffering from headaches at
the time of the trial and that he would continue to suffer
with them in the future. (R. 110) Appellant was in the
hospital for nine days. At the time of the trial he was still
using the traction at night and was still required to wear
the cervical brace at times.
We think the case at bar falls squarely within the rule
announced in Badon v. Suhrm(Jfi'l!Yb, 327 P. 2d 826, ____ Utah
____ , where the court said,
''Nevertheless when the verdict is outside the
limits of any reasonable appraisal of the damages
as shown by the evidence, it should not be permitted to stand, and if the trial court fails to rectify it, we are obliged to make the correction on
appeal.''
The uncontradicted evidence shows that appellant
sustained out-of-pocket losses amounting to the sum of
$2,046.28. The jury in awarding appellant the sum of
$1,004.59 has disregarded the uncontradicted evidence in
the case and its verdict is completely outside the limits
of any reasonable appraisal of the damages as shown by
the evidence. Appellant urges the Supreme Court to
increase the amount of the judgment in this case or in
the alternative to grant appellant a ne'v trial.
Respectfully submitted,
McBROOM & HANNI
Attorneys for Appellant
10
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